However, in light of the contested disease status of infertility, others have suggested that invoking the disease status of infertility to justify or undermine its claim to state-funded treatment is problematic. From a public health ethics perspective, Rebecca Brown et al. argue that focusing on the disease status of infertility is a distraction and instead propose that the discussion of statefunded treatment should focus on the harms associated with involuntary childlessness. 13 In this paper, I offer an analysis of the debate through the lens of philosophy of medicine. By exploring infertility through key approaches to disease in the philosophy of medicine, I aim to expose and unpack in greater detail some of the theoretical underpinnings of the controversy regarding infertility's disease status. As we shall see, the trouble with infertility is that it is a highly heterogeneous category and different theories of disease turn out to disagree radically over what kinds of infertility qualify as diseases. I will also show how the ethical discussion of infertility's claim to state-funded treatment can be supported by a recent theoretical development in the philosophy of medicine, namely the antirealist approach to disease proposed by Marc
Ereshefsky.
14 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I will present three leading philosophical theories of disease, namely Christopher Boorse's bio-statistical theory, 15 Lennart
Nordenfelt's holistic theory of health, 16 and Jerome Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis. 17 This will provide the theoretical backdrop against which to expose the problems regarding infertility's disease status. In the third section, I will distinguish different kinds of infertility and evaluate each against the three aforementioned theories. The purpose is to reveal where there are disagreements between the theories with respect to what kinds of infertility qualify as diseases. In the fourth section, I will present Ereshefsky's antirealist approach to disease and show how this could complement the proposal by Brown et al. to make the ethical considerations raised by the harms associated with infertility more explicit.
Before I proceed further, two clarifications are required. First, I
do not aim in this paper to conclusively settle the debate of whether the aforementioned kinds of infertility ought to be treated using state-funded resources. Rather, my aims are to understand the theoretical issues underlying the disagreement over infertility's disease status and to show how an appropriate philosophical approach could support a more focused ethical debate about the provision of state-funded treatment. Second, as with most philosophical work on disease, this paper uses the term "disease" in a broad sense as | 45
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an umbrella concept that encompasses syndromes, injuries, disabilities and so on. Indeed, there are some contexts in which it is useful to distinguish these different sorts of condition. However, given that my philosophical analysis is concerned with the broad issue of whether infertility is a condition that falls within the remit of medicine, it suffices for the sake of my analysis to use "disease" in the aforementioned broad sense.
| PHILOSOPHI C AL THEORIE S OF DISE A SE
Philosophical theories of disease tend to fall into three broad categories. Naturalistic theories claim that whether something is a disease is purely a matter of biological fact. 18 Normativistic theories claim that whether something is a disease depends on value judgements. 19 Hybrid theories claim that both facts and values are required to determine disease status.
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I now explicate three particular theories of disease, namely the bio-statistical theory, the holistic theory of health, and the harmful dysfunction analysis, which respectively exemplify naturalistic, normativistic and hybrid approaches. I have chosen to present these particular theories not necessarily because I endorse any of them, but because they represent some of the most influential examples of the aforementioned theoretical categories in the philosophical literature. Moreover, they capture many of those features which tend to be associated with conditions that are uncontroversially considered diseases. Hence, they are good examples to illustrate the spectrum of views on the concept of disease.
| The bio-statistical theory
Boorse puts forward a naturalistic theory of disease that defines it as a substandard deviation from normal biological function:
1. The reference class is a natural class of organisms of uniform functional design; specifically an age group of a sex of a species.
2.
A normal function of a part or process within members of the ref-
erence class is a statistically typical contribution by it to their individual survival and reproduction.
3. Health in a member of the reference class is normal functional ability: the readiness of each internal part to perform all its normal functions on typical occasions with at least typical efficiency.
4.
A disease is a type of internal state which impairs health, i.e., reduces one or more functional abilities below typical efficiency.
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Four features of Boorse's theory are worthy of special note. First, Boorse assumes a teleological account of function, according to which the function of a part of a system is whatever it does that contributes towards achieving the system's goals. In the case of a biological organism, Boorse takes the highest goals to be survival and reproduction. Hence, under this account, the function of the heart is to pump blood, because it is in virtue of its pumping blood that the heart contributes to the organism's survival and reproduction. Second, an internal part can be a biological part, such as an organ or cell, or a psychological part, such as a mental module. Third, Boorse assumes a statistical account of normality, such that a part is functioning normally if it is contributing to the goals of a system with statistically typical efficiency, and abnormally if it is contributing below or above typical efficiency. Fourth, Boorse introduces the notion of a reference class, specifically an age group of a sex of a species, in order to limit the attribution of a function to sets of organisms smaller than the entire species. This is because what may be statistically typical for one set within a species may be atypical for another, such as the growth of bones being normal in children but abnormal in adults.
| The holistic theory of health
In contrast to Boorse's naturalistic theory, Nordenfelt puts forward a normativistic theory of disease, according to which the concepts of health and disease are determined by values:
A is completely healthy if, and only if, A has the ability, given standard circumstances, to reach all his or her vital goals. … A has a disease if, and only if, A has at least one organ which is involved in such a state or process as tends to reduce the health of A. The disease is identical with the state or process itself.
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Two features of Nordenfelt's theory warrant special note. First, the vital goals of a person are characterized as "the set of goals which are necessary and jointly sufficient for his minimal happiness." 23 Hence, the theory explicitly depends on the value judgements of individuals. Second, Nordenfelt's concept of disease requires the involvement of "at least one organ," but such involvement need not constitute a deviation from statistically typical efficiency.
| The harmful dysfunction analysis
Critical of both pure naturalistic and pure normativistic theories of disease, Wakefield develops a hybrid theory that integrates biological facts and value judgements. Note that Wakefield uses the term "disorder" rather than "disease":
A condition is a disorder if and only if (a) the condition causes some harm or deprivation of benefit to the person as judged by the standards of the person's culture (the value criterion), and (b) the condition results form its natural function, wherein natural function is an effect that is part of the evolutionary explanation of the existence and structure of the mechanism (the explanatory criterion).
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In contrast with Boorse's teleological account of function,
Wakefield endorses an aetiological account of function based on evolutionary theory, whereby "those mechanisms that happened to have effects on past organisms that contributed to the organisms" reproductive success over enough generations increased in frequency and hence were "naturally selected" and exist in today's "organisms." 25 This is a popular account of function amongst philosophers of biology. 26 Under this account, the function of the heart is to pump blood, because blood pumping is the mechanism of the heart that had causally contributed to the survival of an organism's ancestors and to the evolutionary transmission of this mechanism to the present day organism. A dysfunction is a failure of this evolutionarily selected mechanism. According to Wakefield, such dysfunction is necessary but insufficient for something to be a disorder. In order to be a disorder, the dysfunction must also "cause significant harm to the person under present environmental circumstances and according to pres- 
| Discussion
Whilst extremely influential, these three philosophical theories of disease are not uncontested. Critics of the bio-statistical theory have argued that its neglect of values does not reflect medical uses of health and disease. 29 Moreover, if the claims about certain conditions being diseases are supposed to be value-neutral, then it is unclear how they are supposed to justify normative judgements about whether we ought to treat these conditions. 30 Other critics argue that the bio-statistical theory fails to be genuinely naturalistic due to value judgements being implicitly invoked in its choices of goals, reference classes and measures of statistical typicality.
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A challenge that has been posed against the holistic theory of health is that it is too permissive, because it potentially medicalizes a wide range of afflictions that conventionally would not attract medical attention. 32 The harmful dysfunction analysis aims to avoid such over-permissiveness by setting both factual and evaluative constraints on the concept of disease, but it has still been argued that its evaluative component implies a counterintuitive relativism by suggesting that harmfulness is determined by the values of the particular society in which the bearer resides. 33 The factual component has also been criticized for being of little clinical utility due to its explicit reliance on evolutionary theory, as well as for failing to be exclusively factual due to value judgements being implicitly invoked in its selective attributions of natural functions.
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Despite these criticisms, the three aforementioned theories of disease are very successful at capturing the disease statuses of many paradigmatic medical conditions. This is also in spite of the radical differences in their theoretical bases. For example, all three theories agree that myocardial infarction is a disease, albeit for different reasons. It is a disease under the bio-statistical theory because it involves a part's failure to perform its normal function with statistically typical efficiency for the relevant reference class; it is a disease under the holistic theory of health because an organ is involved in a state that compromises the ability of the person to achieve his or her vital goals; and it is a disease under the harmful dysfunction analysis because it involves a negatively evaluated failure of an evolutionarily selected biological mechanism. This can be said to apply to a wide range of paradigmatic medical conditions, including bronchial carcinoma, gastroenteritis, diabetes mellitus and so on. Therefore, given that they successfully capture the various features associated with uncontroversial disease states, the philosophical theories can serve as useful guides to our normative practices where they agree.
However, as I shall show in the following section, infertility presents a controversial case where the theories disagree.
| THE DAPPLED NATURE OF INFERTILIT Y
One of the challenges with determining the disease status of infertility is that infertility is not a unitary condition, but a heterogeneous category encompassing numerous states of affair. Given this heterogeneity, it is possible that some cases of infertility | 47 MAUNG might be judged to be diseases, whilst other cases might not. In this section, I classify cases of infertility into four subcategories, which I call anatomical infertility, senescent infertility, relational infertility and social infertility. This classification is not intended to correspond to the ways in which cases of infertility are classified in medical theory and clinical practice. Rather, I have chosen this way of classifying cases of infertility because the resultant subcategories highlight issues that are of philosophical relevance to the problem of infertility's disease status. I analyse each subcategory with reference to the aforementioned three theories of disease.
| Anatomical infertility
This subcategory broadly refers to an inability to conceive that is for the most part attributable to a distinctive anatomical, physiological or However, an implication of this theory is that people who are voluntarily using pharmacological contraception or who have had voluntary surgical contraception would be considered to have diseases.
According to the holistic theory of health, the disease status of anatomical infertility depends on the individual's vital goals. Many cases of anatomical infertility are associated with distress because the bearers are unable to achieve their vital goals of having children. 36 Nonetheless, there are also plausibly cases of people whose vital goals do not include procreation, for whom anatomical infertility would not be considered unwelcome. These include people who are using pharmacological contraception or who have had voluntary surgical contraception. Indeed, it has been argued that this dependence on people's preferences is a reason not to consider infertility a disease. 
| Senescent infertility
This refers to the decline in reproductive potential associated with advancing age. Such decline occurs in both sexes, but is more pronounced in women than in men. For that reason, the current discussion will focus on female senescent infertility. an aetiological account of function, the function of the human ovary is to produce euploid ova, because such production of euploid ova is the mechanism of the ovary that had causally contributed to the reproduction of human ancestors and hence to the evolutionary transmission of this mechanism to the present day female human. The failure of the ovary to produce euploid ova that occurs with senescent infertility would therefore constitute a dysfunction. Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that this decline in fertility associated with advancing age is negatively evaluated according to social values. 52 Hence, senescent infertility would be considered a disorder according to this application of the harmful dysfunction analysis.
| Relational infertility
This subcategory covers the scenario where a given couple are unable to conceive despite regular unprotected heterosexual intercourse, but each partner of the couple is typical with respect to his or her physiological capacity for reproduction. For example, each partner may have a reproductive capacity that lies within the statistical range considered normal, but towards the lower part of this range. The combined result is that the partners are unable to conceive with each other, but each partner could nonetheless conceive in various counterfactual situations with different partners.
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Relational infertility might also result from some sort of incompatibility between the partners that is peculiar to the specific couple.
Again, each partner's physiological capacity for reproduction is statistically typical, but they are unable to conceive with each other.
Admittedly, the incompatibility hypothesis is speculative, but some researchers have suggested that it could be related to immunological blood group incompatibility. Under the bio-statistical theory, relational infertility would not qualify as a disease. Boorse defines health as "readiness of each internal part to perform all its normal functions on typical occasions with at least typical efficiency" and disease as "a type of internal state which impairs health." 57 The implication is that a disease is an internal state situated within the individual. As noted above, however, relational infertility is not situated within the individual, but is a property of the state of affairs that extends beyond the individual, namely the couple as a whole. Therefore, it is not a disease. The holistic theory of health, by contrast, allows for relational infertility to be a disease, as long as the person's vital goals include having children with the particular partner. The theory suggests that a person has a disease if he or she "has at least one organ which is involved" in the state or process that impedes his or her ability to achieve his or her vital goals. 58 Hence, an organ needs to be involved, but there is no requirement for this to constitute a deviation from statistical typicality.
As noted above, whilst relational infertility involves the state of affairs external to the individual, this state of affairs still depends on facts about the reproductive capacities of the individual partners. These are facts that concern the states of organs. Therefore, it plausibly qualifies as a disease under the holistic theory of health.
The harmful dysfunction analysis yields a similar outcome to the bio-statistical theory with respect to relational infertility. One of Wakefield's criteria for disorder is "the inability of some internal mechanism to perform its natural function." 59 Again, the requirement for the mechanism to be internal to the individual suggests that relational infertility does not qualify as a disease because it is a property of a state of affairs that extends beyond the individual. Whilst internal processes are involved in relational infertility, they do not constitute failures of evolutionarily selected internal mechanisms, because each member of the couple still has the physiological capacity to conceive in counterfactual situations with different partners. tioned, the inability to conceive is viewed as being harmful in a pronatalist society. Therefore, whether or not the social infertility suffered by people in same-sex relationships fulfils the harmfulness criterion depends on how the differing social attitudes towards homosexuality and childlessness are balanced.
| Social infertility

| Discussion
In this section, I have shown that different philosophical theories of disease disagree over which kinds of infertility do and do not qualify as diseases. The least controversial subcategory is anatomical infertility, most cases of which qualify as diseases under the three aforementioned theories. Nonetheless, there remain some cases of anatomical infertility over which the theories disagree. The other subcategories of senescent infertility, relational infertility and social infertility are more controversial, with equivocal outcomes and radical disagreements between theories. The findings are summarized in Table 1 .
The above analysis exposes some of the key theoretical sticking points that underpin the lack of consensus regarding infertility's dis- These findings are significant, because they suggest that we cannot legitimately invoke claims about infertility's disease status to defend or criticize the provision of state-funded treatment for infertility. As previously mentioned, the three theories of disease, despite their differences, successfully capture the disease statuses of many paradigmatic medical conditions, and so they can serve as useful guides to the normative practices of healthcare professionals where they agree. However, disagreements between the theories flag up controversial cases, such as the different subcategories of infertility,
where consistent judgements about disease statuses are not available to inform such normative practices. And so, given the contested disease status of infertility, we cannot uncontroversially justify or undermine the provision of state-funded treatment by claiming that infertility is or is not a disease. The second objection is that it may still matter to the individual whether or not he or she is considered to have a disease, as this could influence society's normative attitudes towards him or her.
| REFR AMING THE DEBATE
For example, it may matter to a person with opioid dependence that the condition is considered a disease because the disease label is perceived to legitimize the experience of suffering associated with the condition, whilst it may matter to a homosexual person that homosexuality is not considered a disease because the disease label is perceived to cast the person as abnormal and in need of medical treatment. Similarly, whether or not infertility is considered a disease may matter to a person with infertility because of such normative implications of the disease label. In response, whilst I concede that the disease label yields considerable normative influence, I
argue that the conceptual and theoretical ambiguities concerning the label make it a blunt instrument. The label is not associated with a single kind of normative attitude, but with a diverse range of attitudes, including the perceptions that the bearer is not to blame, that the condition requires treatment, and that the bearer is abnormal. In a controversial case such as infertility, not all of these attitudes may be appropriate. Hence, invoking the disease label without further qualification could encourage unwanted attitudes whilst obscuring the considerations that inform these attitudes. An advantage of the approach I have endorsed is that it helps to clarify the ethical considerations raised by infertility, which enables us to be more explicit about the appropriate normative attitudes towards the condition.
The third objection is that state-funded healthcare resources should be reserved for conditions that are unequivocally diseases, and so infertility's claim to such resources is precluded by its contested disease status. In response, I suggest that the remit of medicine is not restricted solely to treating diseases, but also includes managing conditions not generally considered diseases. Examples include contraception to avoid pregnancy and analgesia in childbirth.
Hence, whilst a condition's being a bona fide disease can be taken to provide a prima facie justification for its claim to medical treatment, this in no way precludes equivocal cases from being evaluated with respect to their claims to healthcare resources.
| CON CLUS ION
Whether or not infertility is considered a disease is often assumed to provide a prima facie reason to treat or not treat it. However, different philosophical theories of disease disagree radically about what subtypes of infertility do and do not qualify as diseases. Given that the disease status of infertility is currently uncertain, we cannot uncontroversially justify or undermine the provision of state-funded treatment for infertility by claiming that it is or is not a disease.
Therefore, instead of relying on disease status, the debate needs to explicitly address the specific ethical considerations that are raised by infertility. This is a strategy that has been proposed by 
